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1. Introduction 
Companies have reported on their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) obligations for 
more than three decades (Deegan, 2013). The notion of CSR requires companies to consider the 
social, economic and environmental consequences of their operations and suggests that they 
address the needs and expectations of stakeholders such as investors, customers, suppliers, 
regulators and society. Consequently, growing numbers of companies are informing their 
stakeholders of their social and environmental performance through print-based reporting or their 
websites. Although it is costly and voluntary by nature, companies still embrace in CSR, as it has 
been accepted as a long-term business strategy (Jamali and Mirshak, 2007) and a source of 
competitive advantage. It is a way to gain, maintain and repair legitimacy (Deegan et al., 2000), 
and it enhances a company’s reputation and risk management. 
  
Consistent with the increased importance of CSR, boards’ roles and responsibilities have been 
extended from the traditional shareholder-centric view to encompass various stakeholders. 
Boards of directors influence CSR in various ways, from establishing stakeholder friendly 
corporate policies to creating committees that deal with CSR-related matters. They are also 
expected to monitor company performance financially and socially (Janggu et al., 2014) and are 
accountable for any decisions made by management to serve for the best interest of shareholders. 
The board of directors also plays a pivotal role in a company’s CSR activities. Nevertheless, the 
decision to demonstrate social and environmental responsibility to relevant stakeholders through 
CSR reporting often depends on management’s personal wealth considerations (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that a separation of ownership and 
control in a company provides managers with the incentive to serve their personal interests at the 
expense of shareholders’ interests. In the context of the company, a major issue is the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. This phenomenon can cause the 
public to question the integrity and effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms in organizations. An 
alleged lack of independence is considered the root cause of a board’s failure to effectively 
monitor the actions of management. Therefore, it is claimed that greater emphasis should be 
made on the internal context, which includes boards, particularly to increase shareholder insight 
and influence corporate behaviour in organizations (Buniamin et al., 2011). 
 
Proponents of corporate board reform have long supported increasing independent director 
representation as a means of increasing the objectivity and effectiveness of boards. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) claim that the effectiveness of board monitoring is enhanced by including 
independent directors because they have incentives to perform their monitoring function 
effectively and not collude with managers. This is partly driven by the fact that their reputation 
and their human capital value depend on their judgement as decision control specialists. 
Accordingly, their presence is commonly associated with lower information asymmetry and 
better reporting (Htay et al., 2012). Independent directors also have a significant effect on 
corporate social activities, such as charitable giving (Post et al., 2011), andthe ethical aspects of 
the company’s activities (Ibrahim et al., 2003) and reduce agency cost (Kyereboah-Coleman and 
Biekpe, 2006). These views have eventually led to the movement toward specific board 
guidelines, typically calling for greater representation of independent directors.  
 
This study aims to examine board practices on company CSR reporting in Malaysia. Itis a semi-
developed country with a different economic, legal, and cultural environment from developed 
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countries, where most previous studies have been conducted. Malaysia is characterised by high 
ownership concentration, where family block-ownerships and “dominant” shareholders are 
commonly present in listed companies (Mustapha and Che Ahmad, 2011). Unlike companies 
with dispersed shareholdings, these companies seemingly have reduced agency problems and 
costs due to a better match of control and cash flow rights of shareholders (Mustapha and Che 
Ahmad, 2011). Nonetheless, due to the highly concentrated ownership and control, Malaysian 
listed companies face a unique “principal-principal” agency problem instead of the traditional 
“principal-agent” agency problem (Rashid, 2015).The conflict between family and non-family 
principals emerges when family owners engage in strategies that advance personal, family or 
political agendas at the expense of minority owners. This agency conflict, which includes the 
pursuit of non-economic goals that purportedly diverge from the interest of minority investors, if 
not monitored properly, may lead to severe expropriation of minority shareholders. Coupled with 
ineffective minority shareholder protection, this type of conflict presents a major challenge to 
corporate governance practices in developing countries.  
 
Further, CSR practices often create conflict between minority and controlling shareholders, as 
they reduce the wealth of the latter. Thus, a board of directors, especially one with independent 
directors, plays a major role in addressing this unique conflict. Further, understanding board 
independence and its impact on CSR reporting provides evidence on the effectiveness of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) guidelines. This study also adds to the 
limited literature that addresses principal-principal conflicts in developing countries in addition 
to extending prior work that has mostly focused on the monitoring role of independent directors 
in a traditional agency problem setting. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the literature review 
and research questions. Section three presents an overview of corporate governance and 
corporate board practices in Malaysia. Section four presents the theoretical framework. Section 
five outlines the methodology. Section six presents and discusses the results. The final section is 
the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review and Research Questions 
 
Studies examining board independence and CSR reporting present varying outcomes. There are 
vast arrays of factors that are likely to moderate the relationship, such as differences in the 
institutional context, differences in corporate governance systems, different time periods, the 
unique CSR challenges in each country, and variation in methods applied as well as definitions 
used for the variables. Apart from this, independent directors were included on boards as early as 
the mid-1980s in the US and Europe (Tinggi et. al., 2015). However, a similar idea was brought 
to light by companies in Asia, especially after the financial crisis from the late 1990s until the 
late 2000s. Its evolution has since made the issue of independent directors prominent. The 
development that has taken place shows the differing views of the importance of board 
independence. This is reflected in the results of previous studies. In fact, the idea that the 
majority of the directors of a listed public company should be independent is relatively new in 
many countries. This study is conducted at a time when the issue of independent directors is 
central to effective corporate governance.  
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Leung and Horwitz (2004) report that a positive relationship exists between board independence 
and voluntary segment disclosure for companies listed in Hong Kong. Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006) document a positive relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure 
for 104 Singapore companies. A study of European biotech companies by Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti (2007) shows that the proportion of independent directors has positive effects on the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Examining the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
social and environmental disclosures of banking companies in Malaysia and Australian 
companies, respectively, Htayet. al. (2012) and Rao et. al. (2012) acknowledge the importance of 
independent directors in enhancing companies’ reporting. Likewise, Jiziet. al. (2014) find a 
positive relationship between board independence and CSR reporting. Other studies that report 
comparable results are Rashid and Lodh (2008), Barako and Brown (2008), Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009) and Chau and Gray (2010). Conversely, examining the impact of board composition and 
ownership structure on the voluntary disclosure of 158 Singapore companies, Eng and Mak 
(2003) show that board composition significantly and negatively affects voluntary disclosure. 
Similar findings have been reported bailiff and Cooke (2005). Independent directors are hindered 
in their ability to influence majority board decisions (Abdullah et al., 2011).In the same vein, 
Gul and Leung (2004), along with others(e.g.,Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Rouf, 2011), document 
a negative relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure. Meanwhile, Said 
et al. (2009), Haji (2013), Shamil et al. (2014) and Sartawi et al. (2014) find no evidence of a 
significant association between board independence and CSR disclosures. Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2012) argue that independent directors may be elected to focus mainly on a 
monitoring role only as a way of protecting investors against managerial misbehaviour. Thus, 
reporting aspects have been neglected. Nonetheless, they strongly believe that disclosure should 
be considered an indirect monitoring mechanism. 
 
In general, the majority of the empirical evidence suggests that board independence has some 
impact on CSR reporting. However, studies are scant in developing countries. Hence, the 
objective of this study is to examine the influence of board independence on the CSR reporting 
of public listed companies in Malaysia. 
 
3. Corporate governance and corporate board practices in Malaysia 
 
The Companies Act 1965 provides the laws relating to directors’ roles and responsibilities, while 
the Articles of Association outline the regulations for the internal management of a company’s 
affairs. The law considers a company as a separate legal entity and adopts a “one-tier” Anglo-
American model of corporate governance. This “market or shareholder” model regards the board 
of directors as the uppermost governing body in the company. “One-tier” boards are directly 
involved in company decisions, initiatives and outcomes. To ensure directors act as an effective 
vehicle of corporate governance in Malaysia, they are obliged to undergo a Mandatory 
Accreditation Programme (MAP), which is reinforced by an annual Continuing Education 
Programme (CEP). In addition, Bursa Malaysia, through its Listing Requirement, has also 
provided guidelines on determining independent directors. Practise Note 13 states that an 
independent director Isa director who is independent of management and free from any business 
or other relationship that could interfere with the exercise of independent judgement or the 
ability to act in the best interests of an applicant or a listed issuer. In a one-tier board system, 
members of the board of directors are allowed to hold both executive and non-executive 
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positions. Hence, the objectivity and independence of the directors in monitoring and assessing 
the performance of the management might be hampered, since they may also be a part of the 
management team. This weakens independent directors’ ability to oversee the implementation of 
decisions. 
 
In addition, Malaysia’s corporate ownership is highly concentrated, with most companies either 
family or government owned (Classenset. al., 2000). Controlling shareholders normally hold 
powerful positions on both the top management team and the board of directors, enabling them 
to make important decisions such as those concerning profit-sharing policy. Consequently, this 
causes an inequitable treatment with regard to minority shareholders. There is seldom a 
separation of management and ownership; hence, the agency problem in Malaysia is present. It is 
also common to find that the chairman of the board is also the chief executive officer. 
Considering this, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance recommends, as a best practice, 
that there needs to be a balance on the board of directors with at least one-third of the members 
being independent. Their inclusion is based on (i) their experience and knowledge, (ii) their 
contacts, and (iii) their independence from the CEO. Malaysian business practice is dominated 
by owner-managed companies, where the prime shareholder is also the primary founder. When a 
single body is entrusted with both managing and supervising the company's operations, it is more 
difficult to guarantee the independence of board members. In addition, it is common that 
‘independent’ directors are either family members or friends instead of genuinely independent. 
Accordingly, the degree of independence of many board of directors is questionable. 
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
 
Issues pertaining to corporate governance such as monitoring mechanisms are very much related 
to agency theory. This theory emerged in the 1970s as a powerful framework to address the 
conflicting relationship between owners and managers and to suggest possible resolutions. An 
agency relationship exists when there is a change of control previously held by owners 
(principals) to control by managers (agents). Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the relationship 
as a "contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent" (p. 308). Agency theory argues that the separation of ownership and 
control in companies has resulted in a potential conflict of interests between the owners and their 
managers. It induces managers to exhibit different attitudes toward risk and conflicting goals 
with owners, such as investment in unprofitable projects and excessive use of free cash flow 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). While principal-agent conflicts are prevalent in most developed 
countries, countries with concentrated ownership are confronted with principal-principal agency 
conflicts (Dharwadkar et.al, 2000). Following the incongruence of interests between shareholder 
groups, controlling shareholders can exploit minority shareholders through managerial 
facilitation. 
 
Managers in developed countries are most likely to opt for CSR activities on the grounds of self-
interest even if the corporate governance system is focused on shareholder primacy. To them, 
CSR acts as a personal reputational building tool. This different perception of the purpose of 
CSR can result in a conflict between managers and shareholders. In developing countries with 
potential principal-principal agency conflicts, managers in most cases are less independent 
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from—and may even be strongly affiliated with—founding owners or major shareholders. They 
tend to expropriate value from other shareholders to increase the wealth of the controlling 
owners. Consequently, managers in Malaysia, for instance, might seek opportunities that 
immediately benefit themselves, as well as founding families, by disengaging from longer-term, 
outcome-uncertain and costly social investments (Chang et. al., 2015). Accordingly, despite the 
increasing pressure on companies to engage in CSR, many have resisted it. 
 
How organizations control agency problems has been of great interest. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
note that the board's "most important role is to scrutinize the highest decision makers in the firm" 
(p.294). Given the power to authorize and monitor important decisions enables the board to 
accomplish its monitoring role (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Independent directors are professional 
referees whose task is to stimulate and oversee the competition among the firm's management. 
Agency theory advocates that boards comprising a higher proportion of independent directors are 
more diligent in pursuing their monitoring role, due to their independence from management.  
 
A divergence of interest between managers and shareholders may create information asymmetry; 
hence, incurring agency costs is closely aligned with those interests (Mustapha and Che Ahmad, 
2011). Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of the monitoring 
expenditures by the owners (e.g., the use of boards of directors), the bonding expenditures by 
managers (e.g., the preparation of financial statements) and the residual loss. Two mechanisms 
that can possibly mitigate the agency and asymmetric information problems and alleviate agency 
costs are board monitoring and transparency through disclosure. Htay et al. (2012) suggests that 
disclosure of information, or transparency, is an integral part of corporate governance, as higher 
disclosure can reduce information asymmetry, which not only clarifies the conflicts of interests 
between shareholders and management but also makes management more accountable. Forker 
(1992) fined that the presence of independent board members enhances financial disclosure 
quality and reduced the benefits of withholding information.  
 
Boards of directors have an important role in alleviating agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Researchers with an agency-cantered view believe that independent directors have the 
responsibilities to enhance company transparency in order to protect shareholders’ interests 
(Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). By disclosing more CSR information in annual reports, this 
reduces asymmetric information and enhances or maintains the company’s reputation/protection. 
Therefore, an effective board promotes CSR due to its ability to align managers’ interests with 
the long-term goals of both shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders.  
 
Increased numbers of independent directors on a board creates a higher demand for voluntary 
disclosure to shareholders via better monitoring (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).Therefore, based 
on agency theory, it is hypothesized that board independence positively influences company 
CSR reporting. 
 
5. Methods 
5.1 Data 
 
This study utilised a sample of non-financial companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa 
Malaysia from 2008 until 2013. The study period enabled an examination of the trends in the 
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CSR reporting practices of PLC in Malaysia. To be included in the sample, the company must 
have produced an annual report each year. Although there are quite a number of companies that 
issue stand-alone CSR reports and most companies made disclosure on their website, the 
information on those channels normally replicates what is reported in the annual report (Rashid, 
2015). Initially, there were 813 companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia as of 
31st December 2013. Only 613 companies lodged their annual reports each and every year. 
Companies in the finance sector are subject to different regulatory and disclosure requirements, 
and material differences in their types of operation were thus excluded. Prior studies have not 
considered them (e.g., MohdGhazali, 2007; Said et al., 2009; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005), and 136 
finance companies were excluded from the sample, reducing the potential population to 477 
companies. A further 27 companies were omitted due to incomplete data, which left a sample of 
450 companies (Table 1). 
 
Using the six annual reports for each company as the main source of information is based on 
several justifications. This is consistent with other prior studies (Chan et al., 2014; Abdullah et 
al., 2011; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Haji, 2013). Further, annual reports are presumed to be the 
main vehicle used by companies to communicate information to the public (Hasnah et al., 2006, 
Gray et al., 2001, Othman and Ameer, 2010), including social and environmental reporting 
(Chan et al., 2014).   
 
Table 1 Sample company characteristics 
 
Sector Number of firms in the sample 
Observed firm 
years 
Observation in 
% 
Agricultural Production - Crops 25 150 5.56 
Agricultural Production - Livestock 5 30 1.11 
Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 1 6 0.22 
Metal Mining 3 18 0.67 
Oil and Gas Extraction 4 24 0.89 
Food and Kindered Products 32 192 7.11 
Tobacco Products 1 6 0.22 
Textile Mill Products 2 12 0.44 
Apparel and Other Textile Products 8 48 1.78 
Lumber and Wood Products 25 150 5.56 
Furniture and Fixtures 13 78 2.89 
Paper and Allied Products 19 114 4.22 
Printing and Publishing 7 42 1.56 
Chemicals and Allied Products 11 66 2.44 
Petroleum and Coal Products 4 24 0.89 
Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 18 108 4.00 
Leather and Leather Products 1 6 0.22 
Stone, Clay and Glass Products 21 126 4.67 
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Primary Metal Industries 23 138 5.11 
Fabricated Metal Products 6 36 1.33 
Industrial, Machinery and Equipment 15 90 3.33 
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 24 144 5.33 
Transportation Equipment 11 66 2.44 
Misc. Manufacturing Industries 23 138 5.11 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 5 30 1.11 
General Building Contractors 21 126 4.67 
Heavy Construction, Ex. Building 14 84 3.11 
Wholesale Trade- Durable Goods 11 66 2.44 
Wholesale Trade- Non-Durable Goods 9 54 2.00 
General Merchandise Stores 4 24 0.89 
Food Stores 1 6 0.22 
Automotive Dealers and Service Stations 3 18 0.67 
Apparel and Accessory Stores 2 12 0.44 
Eating and Drinking Places 1 6 0.22 
Hotels and Other Lodging Places 8 48 1.78 
Trucking and Warehousing 4 24 0.89 
Water Transportation 11 66 2.44 
Transportation By Air 1 6 0.22 
Transportation Services 6 36 1.33 
Communications 7 42 1.56 
Real Estate 11 66 2.44 
Business Services 18 108 4.00 
Educational Services 1 6 0.22 
Health Services 8 48 1.78 
Amusement and Recreational Services 2 12 0.44 
Total 450 2700 100.00 
 
 
5.2 Variables 
5.2.1Dependent variables 
 
Content analysis was used to investigate environmental disclosures in the annual reports (e.g., 
Chan et al., 2014; Abdullah et al., 2011; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011; Haji, 2013). Content analysis 
is a technique used by researchers to replicate and make valid inferences from data in their 
context (Krippendorff, 1989) and involves both qualitative and quantitative methods and 
converting information in annual reports into scores (Djajadikerta and Trireksani, 2012). 
 
To assess the content of CSR reporting, a checklist of items was constructed by examining 
previous CSR reporting checklists (e.g., Hackston and Milne, 1996; Barako and Brown, 2008). 
In addition, Malaysian checklists in particular were also referenced (e.g., Abdullah et al., 2011; 
Haji, 2013). To ensure conformation of the checklist items to the listing requirements and their 
relevance to the current Malaysian context, the framework launched by Bursa Malaysia in 2006 
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was also used as a reference. It comprises guidelines for PLCs in defining their CSR priorities, 
implementation and reporting. The framework focuses on four dimensions: Environment, 
Community, Marketplace and Workplace. A checklist of 22 CSR items developed by Abdullah 
et al. (2011)was used as the benchmark. This checklist adapted the work of MohdGhazali 
(2007)and incorporated aspects of Hackston and Milne (1996) and Ng (1985). The referred 
checklist was used to capture CSR reporting of companies in a similar institutional setting as the 
present study, hence confirming its suitability. Checklists by Mohamed Adnan (2012)and Chanet 
al. (2014) were also referenced apart from the inclusion of several items from the Global 
Reporting Initiative Guidelines in an attempt to obtain a more comprehensive checklist. After 
going through several revisions and refinements, the final checklist containing 51 items was 
produced (Table 2).  
 
Each disclosure item was assigned a score of “1” if it is disclosed and “0” if it is not disclosed. 
This has been extensively employed previously (e.g., Haji, 2013; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 
Rashid and Lodh, 2008; MohdGhazali, 2007). The scores were transformed into a CSR reporting 
index by dividing the disclosure score of each company to the maximum possible score (i.e., 1 x 
51= 51). 
 
   CSRIi= 
j
nj
t ij
n
X∑
=1
, 
CSRI = CSR reporting index;  
nj = number of items expected for jth company;  
Xij = 1 if ith item disclosed; 0 if ith item not disclosed 
 
Table 2 CSR Reporting checklist 
 
CSR Reporting Items 
A General (maximum 7 scores) 
1 Acknowledgement or management of corporate social responsibility 
2 Disclosure of corporate objectives or policies with regard to corporate social responsibility 
3 Company’s strategy for addressing sustainability 
4 Mission/ values/ codes of conduct relevant to CSR topics 
5 Commitments to external initiatives (e.g., membership) 
6 Awards received relating to social, environmental and best practices 
7 Discussion on stakeholder engagement 
B Community (maximum 9 scores) 
8 
Charitable donations and activities (such as donations of cash, products or employee 
services to support established community activities, events, organisations, education and 
the arts) 
9 Supporting government/ non-governmental organization campaign (such as supporting 
national pride/government-sponsored campaigns) 
10 Support for public health/ volunteerism (such as blood donation, sponsoring public health 
or recreational projects) 
11 Aid medical research 
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12 Sponsoring educational programs/ scholarship (such as sponsoring educational 
conferences, seminars or art exhibits, funding scholarship programs or activities) 
13 Discussion on public policy involvement 
14 Graduate employment 
15 Sponsoring sports project 
16 Acquisition from local suppliers 
C Environment (maximum 14 scores) 
17 Statements indicating that pollution from operations have been or will be reduced 
18 Discussion on recycling efforts (such as recycled inputs/ recycled waste) 
19 Preventing waste 
20 Disclosure on significant spills/ environmental accidents 
21 Hazardous waste disclosure 
22 Fines/ sanction for non-compliance 
23 
Design facilities that are harmonious with the environment/ landscaping (such as 
contributions in terms of cash or art/sculptures to beautify the environment, restoring 
historical buildings and structures) 
24 Impacts on biodiversity 
25 Strategies/ plans for managing impacts on biodiversity (such as wildlife conservation, protection of the environment, e.g., pest controls) 
26 Environmental review and audit (such as reference to environmental review, scoping, audit, 
and assessment including independent attestation) 
27 Conservation of energy in the conduct of business operations ( using energy more efficiently during the manufacturing process) 
28 Utilizing waste materials for energy production 
29 Disclosure of carbon/ green gas emissions 
30 Initiatives to reduce carbon/ green gas emissions 
D Workplace (maximum 14 scores) 
31 Employee profiles (such as number of employees in the company and/or at each branch/ 
subsidiary,  information on the qualifications and experience of employees recruited) 
32 Employee appreciation (such as information on purchase scheme/ pension program) 
33 Discussion of significant benefit program provided (such as remuneration, providing staff 
accommodation or ownership schemes) 
34 Employee training (such as through in-house training, establishing training centres) 
35 Support to employee education (such as giving financial assistance to employees in 
educational institutions; continuing education courses) 
36 
Information on management-employee relationship/ efforts to improve job satisfaction 
(such as providing information about communication with employees on management styles 
and management programs which may directly affect the employees) 
37 Employee diversity (such as disclosing the percentage or number of minority and/or 
women employees in the workforce and/or in the various managerial levels) 
38 Employee receiving regular reviews 
39 Recreational activities/ facilities 
40 Establishment of a safety department/ committee/ policy 
41 Provision of health care for employee 
42 Compliance to health and safety standards and regulations 
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43 Award for health and safety 
44 Rates of work-related injury/ illness/ deaths (such as disclosing accident statistics) 
E Marketplace (maximum 5 scores) 
45 
Information on any research project set up by the company to improve its products in any 
way (such as the amount/percentage figures of research and development expenditure 
and/or its benefits) 
46 Verifiable information that the quality of the firm’s products has increased (such as ISO9000) 
47 Disclosure of products meeting applicable safety standards (such as information on the 
safety of the firm’s product) 
48 Product sustainability/ use of child labour 
49 Customer service improvements/ awards/ ratings 
F Other (maximum 2 scores) 
50 Value added statements 
51 Value added ratios 
 
5.2.2 Independent and control variables 
 
The independent variable of interest in this study is board independence. Board independence 
refers to independent directors who have no affiliation with the company except for their 
directorship (Bursa Malaysia, 2006). Board independence (BIND) is the number of independent 
directors on the board relative to the total number of directors (Arora and Dharwadkar (2011); 
Harjoto and Jo (2011) and Das et al. (2015). 
 
Following the stream of previous studies, a number of governance attributes and the company’s 
characteristics that might affect CSR reporting are investigated as control variables in this study: 
board size, directors’ ownership, institutional ownership, debt ratio, liquidity, company age, 
company size, profitability, company growth and market capitalisation. Board size is one of the 
governance attributes that has a major influence on a company’s operation. Although there is no 
universal “best” size, García Sánchez et al. (2011) claim that a board should comprise a 
considerable number of experienced directors. They should ensure full deliberation and diversity 
of thinking on governance and other organizational matters. Smaller boards are expected to 
benefit from more efficient communication, coordination and accountability of individual board 
members (Jizi et al., 2014). However, they suffer from limited monitoring ability due to higher 
workloads and less diversified range of expertise. Similarly, larger boards are inefficient because 
they result in weaker control of management and increase agency costs but can offer more 
knowledge and expertise, as well as more capacity for monitoring and sharing workload (Larmou 
and Vafeas, 2010). Board size refers to the number of directors who compose the board (Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013; Jizi et al., 2014). An ideal board size would be different across 
companies. Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
directors, following Rashid (2013). 
 
Directors’ level of ownership is presumed to have an important effect on their willingness to 
monitor managers and enhance shareholders’ value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It helps 
motivate directors to do their monitoring job effectively. Director ownership (DIROWN) is 
expressed as the ratio of total director shareholdings to the total number of shares. Institutional 
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investors are a special group of shareholders with a relatively concentrated larger stake of shares. 
By holding substantial shares in a company, they can exert considerable influence on 
management, including disclosure of CSR information. Institutional ownership (INSTITUT) is 
the ratio of total institutional shareholdings to the total number of shares, as defined by Nasir and 
Abdullah (2004) and Barako et al. (2006).Leverage (DR) is measured by the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. Barnea and Rubin (2010) believe that the need for managers of highly 
leveraged companies to generate and retain cash to service debts might reduce their ability to 
fund CSR activities. Conversely, companies with high debt levels are expected to incur high 
monitoring costs. An opposing view is that they disclose more information to reduce costs (Esa 
and MohdGhazali, 2012) and to meet the needs of their lenders (Abdullah et al., 2011).  
 
Profitability has been demonstrated to have an effect on CSR practices. Since CSR activities are 
not cost-free, and companies that are highly profitable are able to absorb the associated costs; 
hence, they disclose more information to stakeholders. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and Khan 
(2010) show that profitability is a vital factor in relation to disseminating social information by 
companies. Profitability is proxied by Return on Assets (ROA) following Rashid (2014) and 
Sartawi et al. (2014). Rashid (2013) define company growth (GROWTH) as a percentage of 
annual change in sales. Growth is a result of an interaction between a company’s productive 
resources and its market opportunities. Allegedly, when companies experience rapid growth, 
they tend to pay less dividends and seek financing from the market, thus forcing more disclosure 
(Naser et al., 2006). Consequently, the cost of external financing is reduced and improves a 
company’s ability to potentially pursue profitable projects. Further, growth companies show 
greater information asymmetry and higher agency costs (Eng and Mak, 2003). Hence, they are 
expected to disclose more information. Market capitalisation can be used to represent company 
size (Wallace and Naser, 1996). Companies with high market capitalisation are generally 
exposed to political attacks, such as demands by society for the exercise of social responsibility 
or for greater regulation, such as price controls and higher corporate tax (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). These outcomes can be minimised by more comprehensive disclosure. Conversely, 
companies with low market capitalisation are more likely to feel that greater disclosure would be 
detrimental to their competitiveness. Market capitalisation (CAP) is expressed in its natural 
logarithm. 
 
Ho and Taylor (2007) suggest that companies with high liquidity have stronger incentives to 
disseminate more information in their annual reports than companies with lower liquidity. 
Company liquidity (LIQ) is measured as the current ratio (Rashid, 2013, 2014; Ho and Taylor, 
2007).Company age (AGE) is represented by the number of years that it has been listed on Bursa 
Malaysia, expressed as a natural logarithm (Rashid, 2009). There is almost a consensus on the 
existence of a relationship between company size and the extent of disclosures made. Studies by 
Cormier et al. (2011) and Lu and Abeysekera (2014) confirm the result that size is one of the 
major factors determining CSR reporting. Large companies engage in more activities due to 
resource availability, produce more information on these activities and are better able to bear the 
cost of such processes (Andrew et al., 1989). The natural logarithm of total assets as the proxy 
for company size (SIZE) is used, in line with Das et al. (2015), Sartawi et al. (2014) and Rashid 
(2014). 
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5.3 The Model  
 
The following model is estimated to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
attributes and the extent of CSR reporting of Malaysian PLCs: 
CSRIi,t= α + β1BINDi,t + β2BSIZEi,t + β3DIROWNi,t + β4INSTITUTi,t  + β5DRi,t 
+β6LIQi,t+β7AGEi,t   +β8SIZEi,t +β9ROAi,t  +β 10GROWTHi, +β 11CAPi,t 
    +εi,t 
 
 
Where CSRIi,tis CSR index for ith company at time t. BINDi,t is number of independent 
directors to the total number of directors for ith company at time t. BSIZEi,t is the total number 
of directors for ith company at time t. DIROWNi,t is the percentage of director ownership for ith 
company at time t. INSTITUTi,tis the percentage of institutional ownership for ith company at 
time t. DRi,tis debt ratio for ith company at time t. LIQi,tis the liquidity ratio for ith company at 
time t. AGEi,tis the number of listed years on Bursa Malaysia for ith company at time t. SIZEi,tis 
the natural logarithm of total assets for ith company at time t. ROAi,tis the profitability for ith 
company at time t. GROWTHi,tis the company growth in sales for ith company at time t. 
CAPi,tis the market capitalisation for ith company at time t.α is the intercept, β is the regression 
coefficient, andε is the error term. 
 
The first step to ensure the data not only meets the normality assumption but also is free from 
problems of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity. The assumption of normality 
asserts that the distribution of the means across samples is normal, where a bell-curve shape is 
exhibited if it is plotted. However, this assumption of normality turns out to be relatively 
uncontroversial when large samples are used, for instance, for samples more than 30 (Pallant, 
2007). The model is tested using Residual Test/Histogram-Normality Test. and the results 
conform to the assumption. The correlation matrix results presented in Table 3show that the 
correlation coefficients between the independent variables range from -0.009 to 0.839. Gujarati 
(2003) suggests that a multicollinearity problem may exist when the correlation exceeds 0.80, 
which is evident from the correlation between company size and market capitalisation. To 
confirm whether the assumption is violated, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each 
independent is also considered. A value of VIF greater than 10 indicates that multicollinearity is 
present (Gujarati, 2003). However, none of the VIF values in the model exceed 10, indicating 
that multicollinearity is not a serious problem when interpreting the regression results. 
 
The assumption of homoscedasticity is central to any regression model. Homoscedasticity 
describes a situation in which the error term is constant across all values of the independent 
variables. Standard estimation methods are inefficient when the size of the error term differs 
across values of an independent variable, which is also known as heteroscedasticity. The scatter 
plot of the residuals (ZRESID) against the predicted value (ZPRED) of the model indicates 
heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test is thus employed. Likewise, both the Chi square and 
corresponding p values indicate heteroscedasticity. Correction is achieved by applying the 
standard errors of the White (1980) method. Another major assumption of regression is that 
independent variables are not correlated with the error terms. Based on the Hausman Test, when 
this assumption is violated, endogeneity occurs. This causes the regression coefficient in the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to be biased. This can be addressed by using 
AABFJ  |Volume 11, no. 2, 2017 
 
74 
 
Instrumental Variable regression. The F-test for the predicted value of board independence in 
this model is considered not significant. Following Rashid (2014), when the CSR index is used 
as a proxy for CSR reporting, F = 2.28 with p = 0.1314. The results indicate that endogeneity is 
not a problem. Hence, OLS and Instrumental Variable regression are consistent.  
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Table 3 Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 VIF 
1 
BIND 1.00 
          
1.284 
2 
BSIZE -0.414** 1.00 
         
1.402 
3 DIROWN 0.057
**
 -0.089** 1.00 
        
1.126 
4 
INSTITUT -0.077** 0.071** -0.256** 1.00 
       
1.084 
5 DR 0.085
**
 0.007 -0.035 -0.013 1.00 
      
1.136 
6 LIQ 0.094
**
 -0.045* -0.008 0.002 -0.274** 1.00 
     
1.119 
7 
AGE 0.151** -0.011 -0.177** 0.017 0.005 0.063** 1.00 
    
1.204 
8 SIZE -0.053
**
 0.339** -0.181** 0.061** 0.055** -0.067** 0.337** 1.00 
   
3.891 
9 ROA -0.009 0.084
**
 -0.073** 0.062** -0.129** 0.049* 0.051** 0.111** 1.00 
  
1.054 
10 GROWTH -0.029 0.025 -0.009 0.049
*
 0.018 -0.059** 0.000 0.073** 0.039 1.00 
 
1.013 
11 
CAP -0.063** 0.321** -0.156** 0.071** -0.069** 0.035 0.268** 0.839** 0.174** 0.071** 1.00 3.680 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics of CSR reporting and the independent variables are shown in Table 4. 
The average CSR reporting level among PLC is 21.7%. This indicates that despite the existence 
of regulation and awareness campaigns, the level of CSR reporting in Malaysia remains 
moderately low (Lu and Castka, 2009; Ramasamy and Ting, 2004). Huge variation between the 
highest and lowest level of reporting is observed. The finding also implies that transparency and 
reporting are not a strong tradition in Malaysian PLCs (Aaijaz and Ibrahim, 2012). On average, 
boards comprised 45.2% independent directors. As almost half of the board consists of 
independent directors, it is likely for the board to provide more independent judgement, which is 
important in making better decisions for shareholders. There is also a greater chance of 
enhancing board monitoring effectiveness. The results also reveal that PLCs in Malaysia are 
conforming to the MCCG recommendation of having at least one-third independent directors. In 
general, companies have an average board size of 7.2, indicating that a moderately large size of 
board is preferable. The results regarding director ownership illustrate that, on average, they only 
own 4.4% of company shares, with the highest recording 56.8%. Notwithstanding its ability to 
align directors’ interests with shareholders, companies prefer to keep directors ownership levels 
low. By contrast, there is an extreme difference between the minimum (0%) and maximum 
(95.9%) shareholdings by institutions. Average institutional ownership accounts for 26.3% of 
total company shareholding. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the variables (N = 2700) 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD 
CSRI 0.217 0.196 0.039 0.726 0.120 
BIND 0.452 0.430 0.170 1.000 0.128 
BSIZE 7.236 6.686 3.004 18.174 1.296 
DIROWN 0.044 0.003 0.000 0.568 0.088 
INSTITUT 0.263 0.204 0.000 0.959 0.221 
DR 0.402 0.378 0.003 10.319 0.362 
LIQ 3.053 1.785 0.007 96.111 5.199 
AGE 13.985 15.029 1.000 52.985 1.640 
SIZE 12.878 12.650 9.369 18.411 1.447 
ROA 0.062 0.058 -2.898 5.547 0.178 
GROWTH 0.053 0.027 -4.941 8.578 0.478 
CAP 18.798 18.503 12.371 24.810 1.811 
 
6.2 Regression analysis 
 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the adjusted R2 value, which shows that the variation in the extent of 
CSR reporting that can be explained by the independent variables is 37.7%. It is argued that 
independent directors are more objective when making decisions, thereby increasing the chance 
of protecting interests of stakeholders against the possible emergence of opportunist behaviour 
by management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In return, levels of disclosure are increased. It is 
expected that a positive relationship between independent directors and the extent of CSR 
reporting exists. Consistent with that found by Barako and Brown (2008) and Rashid and Lodh 
(2008), the result is significant, which supports this hypothesis. Further, it is predicted that board 
size is positively related to the extent of CSR reporting. The result reveals a significant positive 
relationship between the two variables, indicating that larger boards can benefit from diversity, 
resulting in better involvement in CSR activities and increased reporting (Esa and MohdGhazali, 
2012). This outcome matches those observed of studies by Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009). 
 
Ownership by directors and institution, company age, size, ROA and market capitalisation are 
found to be significantly related to CSR reporting. Directors’ ownership enhances CSR 
reporting, with similar findings reported by Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir and Abdullah 
(2004). This finding supports the statement by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that directors 
ownership helps to match the interests between directors and shareholders. The finding also 
illustrates that institutional ownership significantly influences the extent of CSR reporting, which 
reinforces the findings of Leung and Horwitz (2004) and Nasir and Abdullah (2004). Through 
their power, institutional owners are able to influence management on CSR practices (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Accordingly, companies with institutional investors are more likely to report 
more (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). As predicted, mature companies tend to disclose more CSR 
information in order to demonstrate and reinforce their high reputations. Likewise, larger 
companies report more CSR activities, since the costs of disclosures are funded by profits 
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(Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Furthermore, they are more visible to the public, and they tend to 
be subject to greater political and regulatory pressures from external interest groups (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). To reduce these (potential) political costs, large companies disclose more 
information in order to demonstrate that their actions are legitimate and consistent with good 
corporate citizenship (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Similarly, companies that are highly 
profitable are able to absorb the associated costs and hence disclose more information to 
stakeholders. Regarding market capitalisation, consistent with our expectations, companies with 
high market capitalisation are likely to produce high levels of CSR reporting. 
 
 
Table 5 Relationship between board composition and CSR reporting 
 
 Dependent variable 
 Panel A Panel B 
 (before controlling for 
industry) 
(after controlling for 
industry) 
 CSRI CSRI 
Intercept -0.546 -0.594 
 (-19.575)*** (-17.016)*** 
   
BIND 0.033 0.017 
 (1.878)* (1.021) 
   
BSIZE 0.042 0.031 
 (4.637)*** (3.519)** 
   
DIROWN -0.065 -0.044 
 (-2.657)** (-1.828)* 
   
INSTITUT -0.034 -0.044 
 (-3.597)*** (-4.648)*** 
   
DR 0.001 0.005 
 (0.104) (0.994) 
   
LIQ -0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.637) (-0.995) 
   
AGE 0.022 0.027 
 (4.591)*** (5.591)*** 
   
SIZE 0.027 0.037 
 (10.041)*** (13.619)*** 
   
ROA 0.060 0.046 
 (5.504)*** (4.427)*** 
   
GROWTH -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.093) (-0.181) 
   
CAP 0.014 0.008 
 (6.640)*** (3.844)*** 
   
F statistic 124.567 35.970 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.377 0.465 
   
 
The t tests are presented in the parentheses *p< 0.10; ** p< 0.010; *** p< 0.001 
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It is argued that companies in certain types of industries may face a different degree of pressure 
to disclose information because of competitive reasons (MohdGhazali, 2007). Previous studies 
have provided evidence of a significant systematic variation across industries pertaining to their 
propensity to make CSR reporting (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Giannarakis, 2014). Companies 
with high consumer visibility, a high level of political risk or concentrated intense competition 
significantly disclose more CSR information in their annual reports(Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
MohdGhazali, 2007). The sample in this study comprises companies from multiple industries. To 
control for the effects of industry on reporting activities, the model is modified by adding 
INDUSTRY dummies. Companies are classified based on a two-digit industrial classification 
(SIC) codes. The new regression model isas follows: 
 
CSRIi,t= α + β1BINDi,t + β2BSIZEi,t + β3DIROWNi,t + β4INSTITUTi,t  + β5DRi,t 
+β6LIQi,t+β7AGEi,t   +β8SIZEi,t +β9ROAi,t  +β 10GROWTHi, +β 11CAPi,t 
    +yINDUSTRY  +εi,t 
 
The regression coefficients are shown in Panel B of Table 5. As observed, industry has no effect 
on the majority of independent variables, except for board independence. Its coefficient has 
changed from significant to non-significant. The result seems to indicate that the effectiveness of 
independent directors in promoting CSR reporting is relevant only for certain industries. This 
suggests that while some independent directors are able to execute well their responsibilities in 
one industry, others may not have the capability to do so in other industries. As pointed out by 
Haji (2013) and Shamil et al. (2014), the effectiveness of independent directors in increasing the 
level of CSR reporting might be hampered, plausibly due to the lack of knowledge and 
experience in relation to the type of industry. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This study has examined whether independent directors have any association with the extent of 
CSR reporting of PLCs in Malaysia. Although independent directors are perceived to represent 
stakeholders’ interests, their ability in enhancing company’s CSR reporting is found to be 
industry specific. This finding is likely to be related to the structure of the Malaysian board 
system. The practice of one-tier board system portrays governance by one body that undertakes 
both the management and monitoring functions. When all members of the board are entrusted 
with the same tasks and are obliged to perform the same duties, independent directors are most 
likely to fail to carry out their supervisory functions objectively. It thus remains a problem of the 
one-tier system to find ways to guarantee that a certain number of board members are 
independent. In addition, independent directors are elected based on the notion that they are not 
materially related to the company. Due to their commitment elsewhere, they usually invest too 
little time to really understand the business. This dependence on management means that it is 
difficult to execute the supervisory function when independent directors have limited 
information on the company’s affairs. Perhaps regular board meetings might better familiarise 
them with the company and in turn assist them in making better and more informed decisions. 
Independent directors may also have strong family or friendship ties with management, which 
influences their independence and weakens their monitoring role (Sartawi et al., 2014). Family-
owned businesses being a significant element in the Malaysian economy may also impede 
directors’ independence. In these companies, controlling shareholders are significantly 
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influential, which might help explain independent directors failure to execute the monitoring 
tasks entrusted to them. These clarifications demonstrate the unique principal-principal agency 
conflict that exist in companies with concentrated ownership. Clearly, board independence is 
central in the attempt to overcome the conflict. Nevertheless, the efficacy of independent 
directors is justifiable to certain industry only as evident in this study. Thus, theoretically, the 
findings partially support agency theory in explaining the impact of governance on CSR 
practices in Malaysia. 
 
The study concludes that having more independent directors does not necessarily enhance board 
effectiveness, especially if they are unable to effectively contribute to the board. It is highly 
recommended that policymakers search  for alternative methods of electing independent 
directors, for instance, appointment by a special committee. Importantly, PLCs need to 
continuously recognise the significance of best practices for corporate governance, especially 
when its effect on CSR practices is apparent. For instance, the regression analysis provides 
evidence that board size contributes to the enhancement of CSR reporting. Fundamentally, this 
conclusion indicates that better reporting can result from diverse and knowledgeable directors on 
large boards (Esa and MohdGhazali, 2012). Board size is also associated with the capacity to 
foster effective monitoring to mitigate agency problems. A high number of directors permit the 
board to execute duties effectively, leading to more CSR reporting (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008). 
 
The findings of this study need to be carefully interpreted. Fundamentally, different countries are 
subject to different regulatory and corporate governance mechanisms. For this reason, the results 
cannot be generalised across countries. Further, this study focuses on CSR reporting in annual 
reports only, despite the fact that companies utilise other mass communication mechanisms. In 
view of this, future work should consider other forms of reporting. It would also be interesting to 
assess the effect of other control variables that may play an important role in influencing CSR 
reporting. Ethnicity, competitiveness, politically connected companies and listing status are 
several control variables relevant to the Malaysian context that could be incorporated into the 
model. Finally, because the ability of independent directors to provide impartial perspective in 
decision making is industry specific, as suggested by this study, it provides an opportunity for 
future researchers to conduct an industry-based study on the effectiveness of independent 
directors in enhancing CSR reporting.  
  
AABFJ  |Volume 11, no. 2, 2017 
 
80 
 
References 
 
Aaijaz, N. and Ibrahim, M. (2012), "CSR Inflections: An Overview on CSR Global Strategies 
Adopted by Companies in Malaysia and Other Asian Countries", Journal of Southeast 
Asian Research, Vol. 12, pp. 1-16. https://doi.org/10.5171/2012.266824 
Abdullah, S. N., Mohamad, N. R. and Mokhtar, M. Z. (2011), "Board independence, ownership 
and CSR of Malaysian Large Firms", Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 
417-431. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i2c4p5 
Akhtaruddin, M., Hossain, M. A., Hossain, M. and Yao, L. (2009), "Corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports of Malaysian listed firms",  Journal of 
Applied Management Accounting Research, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 1-19. 
Allegrini, M. and Greco, G. (2013), "Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary 
disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies",  Journal of Management & 
Governance, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 187-216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-011-9168-3 
Anderson, C. L. and Bieniaszewska, R. L. (2005), "The role of corporate social responsibility in 
an oil company's expansion into new territories",  Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.71 
Andrew, B., Gul, F., Guthrie, J. and Teoh, H. Y. (1989), "A note on corporate social disclosure 
practices in developing countries: the case of Malaysia and Singapore",  The British 
Accounting Review, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 371-376.  
 https://doi.org/10.1016/0890-8389(89)90034-6 
Arora, P. and Dharwadkar, R. (2011), "Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR): The moderating roles of attainment discrepancy and organization slack",  
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 136-152. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00843.x 
Barako, D. G. and Brown, A. M. (2008), "Corporate social reporting and board representation: 
evidence from the Kenyan banking sector",  Journal of Management & Governance, Vol. 
12 No. 4, pp. 309-324. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-008-9053-x 
Barnea, A. and Rubin, A. (2010), "Corporate social responsibility as a conflict between 
shareholders",  Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 97 No. 1, pp. 71-86. 
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0496-z 
Bathala, C. T. and Rao, R. P. (1995), "The determinants of board composition: An agency theory 
perspective",  Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 59-69. 
 https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4090160108 
Brammer, S. and Pavelin, S. (2008), "Factors influencing the quality of corporate environmental 
disclosure",  Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 120-136. 
 https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.506 
Buniamin, S., Alrazi, B., Johari, N. H. and Rahman, N. R. A. (2011), "Corporate Governance 
Practices and Environmental Reporting of Companies in Malaysia: Finding Possibilities 
of Double Thumbs Up",  Jurnal Pengurusan, Vol. 32 No. 2011, pp. 55-71. 
Bursa Malaysia (2006), "CSR Framework for Malaysian PLCs", available at:  
www.bursamalaysia.com (accessed 28 June 2015). 
Cerbioni, F. and Parbonetti, A. (2007), "Exploring the effects of corporate governance on 
intellectual capital disclosure: an analysis of European biotechnology companies",  
European Accounting Review, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 791-826.  
 https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180701707011 
  
Ahmad, Rashid &Gow |Board Independence and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting in Malaysia 
 
81 
 
 
Chan, M. C., Watson, J. and Woodliff, D. (2014), "Corporate governance quality and CSR 
disclosures",  Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 125 No. 1, pp. 59-73. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1887-8 
Chau, G. and Gray, S. J. (2010), "Family ownership, board independence and voluntary 
disclosure: Evidence from Hong Kong",  Journal of International Accounting, Auditing 
and Taxation, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 93-109. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2010.07.002 
Chau, G. K. and Gray, S. J. (2002), "Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in 
Hong Kong and Singapore",  The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 
247-265. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0020-7063(02)00153-X 
Cheng, E. C. and Courtenay, S. M. (2006), "Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary 
disclosure", The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 41 No. 3, pp. 262-289. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2006.07.001 
Cormier, D., Ledoux, M.-J. and Magnan, M. (2011), "The informational contribution of social 
and environmental disclosures for investors", Management Decision, Vol. 49 No. 8, pp. 
1276-1304. https://doi.org/10.1108/00251741111163124 
Das, S., Dixon, R. and Michael, A. (2015), "Corporate social responsibility reporting: a 
longitudinal study of listed banking companies in Bangladesh", World Review of 
Business Research, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 130-154. 
Deegan, C., Rankin, M. and Voght, P. (2000), "Firms' disclosure reactions to major social 
incidents: Australian evidence".  Accounting Forum, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 101-130. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6303.00031 
Djajadikerta, H. G. and Trireksani, T. (2012), "Corporate social and environmental disclosure by 
Indonesian listed companies on their corporate web sites",  Journal of Applied 
Accounting Research, Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 21-36.  
 https://doi.org/10.1108/09675421211231899 
Donnelly, R. and Mulcahy, M. (2008), "Board structure, ownership, and voluntary disclosure in 
Ireland",  Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 16 No. 5, pp. 416-429. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00692.x 
Eng, L. L. and Mak, Y. T. (2003), "Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure",  Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 325-345.  
 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0278-4254(03)00037-1 
Esa, E. and Mohd Ghazali, N. A. (2012), "Corporate social responsibility and corporate 
governance in Malaysian government-linked companies",  Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 292-305. 
 https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701211234564 
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983), "Agency problems and residual claims",  Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 327-349. https://doi.org/10.1086/467038 
Forker, J. J. (1992), "Corporate governance and disclosure quality",  Accounting and Business 
Research, Vol. 22 No. 86, pp. 111-124. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.1992.9729426 
García Sánchez, I.-M., Rodríguez Domínguez, L. and Gallego Álvarez, I. (2011), "Corporate 
governance and strategic information on the internet: A study of Spanish listed 
companies",  Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 471-501. 
 https://doi.org/10.1108/09513571111133063 
Giannarakis, G. (2014), "The determinants influencing the extent of CSR disclosure",  
International Journal of Law and Management, Vol. 56 No. 5, pp. 393-416. 
 https://doi.org/10.1108/IJLMA-05-2013-0021 
AABFJ  |Volume 11, no. 2, 2017 
 
82 
 
Gray, R., Javad, M., Power, D. M. and Sinclair, C. D. (2001), "Social and environmental 
disclosure and corporate characteristics: a research note and extension",  Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 28 No. 3‐4, pp. 327-356. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00376 
Gujarati, D. N. 2003. Basic Econometrics. 4th. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Gul, F. A. and Leung, S. (2004), "Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary 
corporate disclosures",  Journal of Accounting and public Policy, Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 351-
379. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2004.07.001 
Hackston, D. and Milne, M. J. (1996), "Some determinants of social and environmental 
disclosures in New Zealand companies", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 77-108. https://doi.org/10.1108/09513579610109987 
Haji, A. A. (2013), "Corporate social responsibility disclosures over time: evidence from 
Malaysia",  Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 28 No. 7, pp. 647-676. 
 https://doi.org/10.1108/MAJ-07-2012-0729 
Haniffa, R. M. and Cooke, T. E. (2005), "The impact of culture and governance on corporate 
social reporting",  Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 24 No. 5, pp. 391-430. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2005.06.001 
Harjoto, M. A. and Jo, H. (2011), "Corporate governance and CSR nexus",  Journal of Business 
Ethics, Vol. 100 No. 1, pp. 45-67. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0772-6 
Hasnah, H., Sofri, Y., Sharon, M. and Ishak, I. (2006), "Level of corporate social disclosure in 
Malaysia",  Malaysian Accounting Review, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 159-184. 
Hermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, M. S. 2007. Transparency and corporate governance.NBER 
Working Paper No. 12875,National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington DC. 
Ho, L. C. J. and Taylor, M. E. (2007), "An Empirical Analysis of Triple Bottom‐Line Reporting 
and its Determinants: Evidence from the United States and Japan",  Journal of 
International Financial Management & Accounting, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 123-150. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-646X.2007.01010.x 
Ho, S. S. and Wong, K. S. (2003), "Preparers' perceptions of corporate reporting and 
disclosures",  International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 71-
81. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jdg.2040014 
Htay, S. N. N., Rashid, H. M. A., Adnan, M. A. and Meera, A. K. M. (2012), "Impact of 
corporate governance on social and environmental information disclosure of Malaysian 
listed banks: Panel data analysis",  Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting, Vol. 4 No. 1, 
pp. 1-24. https://doi.org/10.5296/ajfa.v4i1.810 
Ibrahim, H. and Samad, F. A. (2011), "Corporate governance mechanisms and performance of 
public-listed family-ownership in Malaysia",  International Journal of Economics and 
Finance, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 105-120. https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v3n1p105 
Ibrahim, N. A., Howard, D. P. and Angelidis, J. P. (2003), "Board members in the service 
industry: An empirical examination of the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility orientation and directorial type",  Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 47 No. 
4, pp. 393-401. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1027334524775 
Jaffar, R., Mardinah, D. and Ahmad, A. (2013), "Corporate Governance and Voluntary 
Disclosure Practices: Evidence from a Two Tier Board Systems in Indonesia",  Jurnal 
Pengurusan, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 83-92. 
Jamali, D. and Mirshak, R. (2007), "Corporate social responsibility (CSR): Theory and practice 
in a developing country context",  Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 72 No. 3, pp. 243-
262. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9168-4 
Ahmad, Rashid &Gow |Board Independence and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting in Malaysia 
 
83 
 
Janggu, T., Darus, F., Zain, M. M. and Sawani, Y. (2014), "Does Good Corporate Governance 
Lead to Better Sustainability Reporting? An Analysis Using Structural Equation 
Modeling",  Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 145, pp. 138-145. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.06.020 
Jensen, M. C. (2002), "Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective 
function",  Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 235-256.  
 https://doi.org/10.2307/3857812 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976), "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure",  Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 305-
360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X 
Jizi, M. I., Salama, A., Dixon, R. and Stratling, R. (2014), "Corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility disclosure: evidence from the US banking sector",  Journal of 
Business Ethics, Vol. 125 No. 4, pp. 601-615. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1929-2 
Khan, A., Muttakin, M. B. and Siddiqui, J. (2013), "Corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility disclosures: Evidence from an emerging economy",  Journal of Business 
Ethics, Vol. 114 No. 2, pp. 207-223. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1336-0 
Khan, H.-U.-Z. (2010), "The effect of corporate governance elements on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reporting: Empirical evidence from private commercial banks of 
Bangladesh",  International Journal of Law and Management, Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 82-109. 
 https://doi.org/10.1108/17542431011029406 
Kolk, A. (2010), "Trajectories of sustainability reporting by MNCs",  Journal of World Business, 
Vol. 45 No. 4, pp. 367-374. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2009.08.001 
Krippendorff, K. (1989), Content analysis,  Oxford University Press, New York. 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A. and Biekpe, N. (2006), "The relationship between board size, board 
composition, CEO duality and firm performance: Experience from Ghana",  Corporate 
Ownership and Control, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 114-122. 
Larmou, S. and Vafeas, N. (2010), "The relation between board size and firm performance in 
firms with a history of poor operating performance",  Journal of Management & 
Governance, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 61-85. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-009-9091-z 
Leung, S. and Horwitz, B. (2004), "Director ownership and voluntary segment disclosure: Hong 
Kong evidence", Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, Vol. 15 
No. 3, pp. 235-260. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-646X.2004.00109.x 
Lu, J. Y. and Castka, P. (2009), "Corporate social responsibility in Malaysia–experts' views and 
perspectives",  Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, Vol. 16 
No. 3, pp. 146-154. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.184 
Lu, Y. and Abeysekera, I. (2014), "Stakeholders' power, corporate characteristics, and social and 
environmental disclosure: evidence from China",  Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 
64 No. pp. 426-436. 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (2000), "Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
2000", available at:  http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/mccg_mar2000.pdf, (accessed 
2 August 2015). 
Michelon, G. and Parbonetti, A. (2012), "The effect of corporate governance on sustainability 
disclosure",  Journal of Management & Governance, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 477-509. 
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-010-9160-3 
  
AABFJ  |Volume 11, no. 2, 2017 
 
84 
 
 
Mohd Ghazali, N. A. (2007), "Ownership structure and corporate social responsibility disclosure: 
some Malaysian evidence",  Corporate Governance: The International Journal of 
Business in Society, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 251-266.  
 https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700710756535 
Mustapha, M. and Che Ahmad, A. (2011), "Agency theory and managerial ownership: evidence 
from Malaysia",  Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 26 No. 5, pp. 419-436. 
 https://doi.org/10.1108/02686901111129571 
Naser, K., Al-Hussaini, A., Al-Kwari, D. and Nuseibeh, R. (2006), "Determinants of corporate 
social disclosure in developing countries: The case of Qatar",  Advances in International 
Accounting, Vol. 19, pp. 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0897-3660(06)19001-7 
Nasir, N. M. and Abdullah, S.-N. (2004), "Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance 
among financially distressed firms in Malaysia",  Financial Reporting, Regulation and 
Governance, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 95-139. 
Ng, L. W. (1985), Social responsibility disclosures of selected New Zealand companies for 1981, 
1982 and 1983, Occasional Paper No. 54, Faculty of Business, Massey University, 
Palmerston North. 
Ntim, C. G. and Soobaroyen, T. (2013), "Black economic empowerment disclosures by South 
African listed corporations: The influence of ownership and board characteristics",  
Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 116 No. 1, pp. 121-138.  
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1446-8 
Othman, R. and Ameer, R. (2010), "Environmental disclosures of palm oil plantation companies 
in Malaysia: a tool for stakeholder engagement",  Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp. 52-62. 
Pallant, J. (2007), SPSS survival manual: A step-by-step guide to data analysis using SPSS 
version 15,  McGraw-Hill Education, Berkshire, England. 
Post, C., Rahman, N. and Rubow, E. (2011), "Green governance: Boards of directors’ 
composition and environmental corporate social responsibility",  Business & Society, 
Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 189-223. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650310394642 
Ramasamy, B. and Ting, H. W. (2004), "A comparative analysis of corporate social 
responsibility awareness",  Journal of Corporate Citizenship, Vol. 13, pp. 109-123. 
 https://doi.org/10.9774/GLEAF.4700.2004.sp.00013 
Rao, K. and Tilt, C. (2015), "Board Composition and Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role 
of Diversity, Gender, Strategy and Decision Making",  Journal of Business Ethics, DOI 
10.1007/s10551-015-2613-5. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2613-5 
Rashid, A. (2013), "CEO duality and agency cost: evidence from Bangladesh",  Journal of 
Management & Governance, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 989-1008.  
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-012-9213-x 
Rashid, A. (2014), "Revisiting agency theory: Evidence of board independence and agency cost 
from Bangladesh",  Journal of Business Ethics,Vol. No. pp. 1-18. 
Rashid, A. (2015),“Managerial Ownership and Agency Cost: Evidence from 
Bangladesh”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. No. pp. 1-13. 
Rashid, A. (2015),“The influence of stakeholder power on corporate social responsibility: 
evidence from a relationship-based economy”, Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 11 No. 
2, pp. 270-289. https://doi.org/10.1108/SRJ-09-2013-0109 
Rashid, A. and Lodh, S. C. (2008), "The influence of ownership structures and board practices 
on corporate social disclosures in Bangladesh",  Research in Accounting in Emerging 
Ahmad, Rashid &Gow |Board Independence and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reporting in Malaysia 
 
85 
 
Economies, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 211-237. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1479-3563(08)08008-0 
Rashid, M. (2009). Corporate governance in developing countries: a case study of Bangladesh. 
PhD. Thesis, University of Wollongong, Wollongong. 
Rouf, M. (2011), "Corporate characteristics, governance attributes and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in Bangladesh",  African Journal of Business Management, Vol. 5 No. 19, pp. 
7836-7845. 
Said, R., Hj Zainuddin, Y. and Haron, H. (2009), "The relationship between corporate social 
responsibility disclosure and corporate governance characteristics in Malaysian public 
listed companies",  Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 212-226. 
 https://doi.org/10.1108/17471110910964496 
Sartawi, I. I. M., Hindawi, R. M., Bsoul, R. and Ali, A. E. J. (2014), "Board Composition, Firm 
Characteristics, and Voluntary Disclosure: The Case of Jordanian Firms Listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange",  International Business Research, Vol. 7 No. 6, pp. p67. 
 https://doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v7n6p67 
Shamil, M. M., Shaikh, J. M., Ho, P.-L. and Krishnan, A. (2014), "The influence of board 
characteristics on sustainability reporting: Empirical evidence from Sri Lankan firms",  
Asian Review of Accounting, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 78-97.  
 https://doi.org/10.1108/ARA-09-2013-0060 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997), "A survey of corporate governance",  The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 737-783. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x 
Sulaiman, M., Abdullah, N. and Fatima, A. H. (2014), "Determinants of environmental reporting 
quality in Malaysia",  International Journal of Economics, Management and Accounting, 
Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 63-90. 
Tinggi, M., Md Isa, A. H. and Jakpar, S. (2015),“A Propitious Approach towards Independent 
Directors in Malaysian Firms' Board Committee”, International Business Research, Vol. 
8 No. 10, pp. 81-92. https://doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v8n10p81 
Wallace, R. O. and Naser, K. (1996), "Firm-specific determinants of the comprehensiveness of 
mandatory disclosure in the corporate annual reports of firms listed on the stock 
exchange of Hong Kong",  Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 14 No. 4, pp. 
311-368. https://doi.org/10.1016/0278-4254(95)00042-9 
Wan Abd Rahman, N. H., Mohamed Zain, M. and Yaakop Yahaya Al-Haj, N. H. (2011), "CSR 
disclosures and its determinants: evidence from Malaysian government link companies",  
Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 181-201.  
 https://doi.org/10.1108/17471111111141486 
Watts, R. L. and Zimmerman, J. L. (1990), "Positive accounting theory: a ten year perspective",  
Accounting Review, Vol. 65 No. 1, pp. 131-156. 
Weisbach, M. S. (1988), "Outside directors and CEO turnover",  Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 431-460. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90053-0 
White, H. (1980), "A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroskedasticity",  Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, Vol. 48 No. 
4, pp. 817-838. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912934 
Zahra, S. A. and Stanton, W. W. (1988), "The implications of board of directors composition for 
corporate strategy and performance",  International Journal of Management, Vol. 5 No. 
2, pp. 229-236. 
 
